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______________ 
 
O P I N I O N 
_______________ 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 Thomas Foglia appeals the District Court’s order 
dismissing his qui tam claim brought under the False Claims 
Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et. seq.  Foglia’s complaint arises out 
of claims submitted or presented to Medicare by Defendant 
Renal Ventures (“Renal”) that Foglia alleges are fraudulent.  
The District Court dismissed on the ground that the complaint 
failed to state a claim.1 
I. 
                                              
1   The District Court had jurisdiction over Relator Foglia’s 
federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and over 
Relator’s related state law claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de 
novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).  See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 
20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).  We “are required to 
accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after 
construing them in the light most favorable to the non-
movant.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
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 Foglia is a registered nurse who was employed with 
Renal starting on March 13, 2007, and was terminated around 
November 7, 2008.  (App. 34)  Renal is a dialysis care 
services company.  (App. 34)  Foglia filed a qui tam 
complaint against Renal on behalf of himself as a relator and 
on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act 
(“FCA”) in April 2009.  (App. 25)  The United States chose 
not to intervene.  (App. 25)  Foglia filed an amended 
complaint, and the District Court granted Renal’s motion for 
judgment on the pleadings and gave Foglia twenty days to file 
a second amended complaint.  (App. 67, 29)  It was Foglia’s 
second amended complaint (“SAC”) that was before the 
District Court in the proceeding below.  (App. 33)  
 
 In the argument before us, counsel for Foglia described 
his claim as in two parts; one was certification and the other 
was retaliation.2  He claimed that Renal violated the FCA by 
falsely certifying that it was in compliance with state 
regulations regarding quality of care, by falsely submitting 
claims for reimbursement for the drug Zemplar, and by 
reusing single-use Zemplar vials. (App. 50-56)   The District 
Court granted Renal’s Motion to Dismiss the FCA complaint 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because it 
                                              
2   The retaliation claim was not considered by the District 
Court and is not relevant to this appeal.  Foglia also sued 
under the New Jersey False Claims Act for the same 
violations and brought suit under the New Jersey 
Conscientious Employee Protection Act.  (App. 56-58)  
Because Renal had not moved to dismiss Foglia’s state law 
claims, the District Court chose not to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over these claims and dismissed them without 
prejudice.  We therefore need not consider them here.    
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determined that Foglia had failed to state his claim with the 
heightened level of particularity required by Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9(b) for fraud claims.  (App. 12-13)  In 
particular, the District Court focused on Foglia’s failure to 
provide a “representative sample” (App. 12) or to “identify 
representative examples of specific false claims made to the 
Government.” (App. 16)  The District Court also determined 
that even if Foglia’s claim had met the requirement of Rule 
9(b), Foglia “provided no authority under an express or 
implied false certification theory that the claims submitted by 
defendant violated a rule or statute establishing compliance as 
a condition of payment.”  (App. 16)  The District Court 
dismissed the SAC with prejudice, stating that it did so in 
light of the fact that Foglia had twice amended his complaint 
and had engaged in initial discovery.  (App. 22)  Foglia here 
appeals the dismissal of his claim in relation to over-billing 
on Zemplar.  
 
II. 
 
 Before we are able to decide whether Foglia has met 
the higher pleading requirements set by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b), and so whether he has stated a claim under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we must first 
determine what Rule 9(b) requires of an FCA claimant, an 
issue this court has not had occasion to rule on specifically.  
Rule 9(b) states, “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must 
state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or 
mistake.  Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a 
person’s mind may be alleged generally.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
9(b).  However, the various Circuits disagree as to what a 
plaintiff, such as Foglia, must show at the pleading stage to 
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satisfy the “particularity” requirement of Rule 9(b) in the 
context of a claim under the FCA. 
 The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
held that a plaintiff must show “representative samples” of 
the alleged fraudulent conduct, specifying the time, place, and 
content of the acts and the identity of the actors.  See United 
States ex rel. Noah Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 
707 F.3d 451, 455-56 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 2014 WL 
1271321 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2014) (No. 12-1349); United States 
ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 510 
(6th Cir. 2007); United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke's Hosp., 
Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 557 (8th Cir. 2006); United States ex rel. 
Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301, 1308, 
1312 (11th Cir. 2002).   The First,3 Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, 
however, have taken a more nuanced reading of the 
heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), holding that it 
is sufficient for a plaintiff to allege “particular details of a 
scheme to submit false claims paired with reliable indicia that 
lead to a strong inference that claims were actually 
submitted.”  United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 
F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Ebeid ex rel. United 
States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010).   
 
 In United States ex Rel. Wilkins v. United Health 
Group, Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 308 (3d Cir. 2011), we noted that 
                                              
3   The First Circuit previously held the more restrictive view.  
See United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield 
Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 226 (1st Cir. 2004), but has recently 
moved to a more relaxed approach much closer to that 
followed by the Fifth Circuit.  See United States ex rel. 
Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29 (1st 
Cir. 2009).  
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we had never “held that a plaintiff must identify a specific 
claim for payment at the pleading stage of the case to state a 
claim for relief.”  (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted).  
While that conclusion does not itself commit us to the more 
nuanced standards favored by the First, Fifth, and Ninth 
Circuits, it is hard to reconcile the text of the FCA, which 
does not require that the exact content of the false claims in 
question be shown, with the “representative samples” 
standard favored by the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh 
Circuits.  As the Fifth Circuit has stated, requiring this sort of 
detail at the pleading stage would be “one small step shy of 
requiring production of actual documentation with the 
complaint, a level of proof not demanded to win at trial and 
significantly more than any federal pleading rule 
contemplates.”  Grubb, 565 F.3d at 190 (citations and 
footnote omitted).   
 
 Furthermore, in a recent brief for the United States as 
amicus curiae, filed in relation to the petition for a writ of 
certiorari in United States ex rel. Noah Nathan, 707 F.3d 451, 
a case presenting a factual situation similar to that presented 
here, the Solicitor General indicated that the United States 
also believes that the heightened or “rigid” pleading standard 
required by the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits is 
“unsupported by Rule 9(b) and undermines the FCA’s 
effectiveness as a tool to combat fraud against the United 
States.”  The Solicitor General’s brief further states that 
“pleading the details of a specific false claim presented to the 
government is not an indispensable requirement of a viable 
FCA complaint.”  Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae at 10-11, United States ex rel Noah Nathan v. Takeda 
Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 2014 WL 1271321 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2014) 
(No. 12-1249), denying cert. to 707 F.3d 451.  The Solicitor 
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General also noted that even the Circuits which purport to 
follow the “rigid understanding of Rule 9(b)” have “not 
consistently adhered” to it, id. at 13, providing a further 
ground for doubting whether the “rigid” understanding of 
Rule 9(b) could be the correct one. 4  Insofar as the purpose of 
Rule 9(b) is to “provide[] defendants with fair notice of the 
plaintiffs’ claims,” id., the more “nuanced”5 approach 
followed by the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits will 
suffice.  That standard is also compatible with our earlier 
ruling in Wilkins, and we will use that standard in this case.     
      
III. 
 
 We thus turn to the question of whether Foglia has met 
the requirements of Rule 9(b) as set out above.  Although not 
presented as clearly as it might be, Foglia’s “overfill” claim is 
best understood as a “factually false” claim.  “A claim is 
factually false when the claimant misrepresents what goods or 
services that it provided to the Government.”  Wilkins, 659 
F.3d at 305.  Foglia contends that Renal over-charged the 
government for Zemplar, a prescription drug used for the 
prevention and treatment of secondary hyperparathyroidism 
associated with chronic kidney disease.  Zemplar comes in 
vials of three sizes, but Renal only uses 5 microgram (“mcg”) 
                                              
4 For reasons unrelated to the proper pleading standard 
required by Rule 9(b) in a FCA case, the Solicitor General did 
not recommend granting certiorari in United States ex rel. 
Noah Nathan, even though the Solicitor General argued that 
the incorrect standard had been applied by the Fourth Circuit.  
Id.     
5 The Solicitor General’s brief uses this construction, and we 
find it appropriate. 
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vials.  The vials were originally designed to be single-use 
only, with any unused medicine (characterized, somewhat 
misleadingly, as “overfill” by Foglia6) discarded.  When 
Zemplar vials are used in this single-use fashion, Medicare is 
charged for the full content of the vial, no matter how much 
of the content is actually used.  Foglia contends that Renal 
charged Medicare as if Renal were using the 5 mcg vials in 
the recommended “single use” fashion, when in fact it 
harvested unused portions from vials and used this harvested 
amount on other patients. (App. 47-48) 
 
 Originally, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (“HSS”) required that Zemplar always be used in a 
single use fashion.  However, in September of 2002 (several 
years before the alleged false claim in this case),  HSS issued 
a memorandum allowing for the multiple use of individual 
Zemplar vials and other injectable medicines if six conditions 
were followed, so as to ensure the safe use of the medicine.  
(App.  60)7  Foglia contends that Renal “continued multiple 
                                              
6   Put most accurately, “overfill” is the “extra” amount of a 
medicine in a vial which is always included so as to ensure 
that a full dose of the labeled amount for the vial is possible, 
despite any incidental waste.  For example, when, only 2 
mcgs of a 5 mcg vial are used, the remaining 3 mcgs are not 
strictly “overfill.”  The name used here is not important, 
however.  What matters is the claim that Renal was 
harvesting “extra” Zemplar from already-used vials to 
administer to patients.   
7   Foglia, in his brief and in his SAC, styles these conditions 
as “express ‘conditions for receiving payment’.”  (App. 46)  
Though we have not directly ruled on the issue, it is highly 
doubtful these conditions for safe use are properly 
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use of single use vials of injectable medications such as 
Zemplar consistently without regard to complying with the 
conditions set forth by HHS.”  (App. 47)  Because we are at 
the complaint stage in the proceedings we must accept as true 
all allegations in the complaint, and therefore must accept the 
allegation that Renal did not, in fact, comply with the 
required recommendations by HHS for the safe re-use of 
Zemplar vials.  
 
 In order for Foglia to satisfy the standards of Rule 
9(b), as we have adopted them here, he must provide 
“particular details of a scheme to submit false claims paired 
with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims 
were actually submitted.”  See Grubbs, 565 F.3d  at 190.  
Describing a mere opportunity for fraud will not suffice.   
Sufficient facts to establish “a plausible ground for relief” 
must be alleged.  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 
211 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted).  While not 
presented as clearly as it might be, the essentials of Foglia’s 
factually false claim argument seem to be as follows.  
Inventory logs maintained by Renal show that, during the 
month of October 2008, Renal used from 29 to 35 vials of 
Zemplar per day.  (App. 75-6)  Because Renal orders Zemplar 
                                                                                                     
“conditions for receiving payment.”  Cf. Mikes v. Straus, 274 
F.3d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 2001) (“the False Claims Act was not 
designed for use as a blunt instrument to enforce compliance 
with all medical regulations—but rather only those 
regulations that are a precondition of payment.”)  However, 
while this would be relevant for a “legally false” claim 
argument, Foglia seems to have abandoned this argument, 
and the “conditions for receiving payment” aspect is not 
directly relevant for a “factually false” claim argument.   
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in only 5 mcg vials (App. 48), it would have needed 50 vials 
of Zemplar each of the days in question for the number of 
patients actually seen each day, if the 5 mcg vials were used 
in the single use fashion.   (App. 76)  Foglia contends that 
because renal was using only 29-35 vials of Zemplar per day, 
it must have been harvesting unused Zemplar from previously 
used vials.  However, these allegations are not enough to 
establish a “strong inference” that false claims were 
submitted, as the use of harvested “extra” Zemplar is 
permitted if the HHS recommendations noted above are 
followed, and it is therefore possible that Renal was not over-
charging.   
 
 We are therefore faced with two possible scenarios.  
Either, as Foglia alleges, Renal was charging the government 
as if it were using vials of Zemplar in the single use fashion 
while actually harvesting and using “extra” Zemplar from the 
vials, or Renal was using the “extra” Zemplar from bottles 
and only charging the government for the actual volume of 
Zemplar used, despite not being in compliance with the 
regulations for using Zemplar in this fashion.  While both 
scenarios are possible, it is unclear what would motivate the 
second, as it would expose Renal to possible sanctions for 
failure to comply with required procedures, and would not 
provide any financial incentive.   
 
 This is a close case as to meeting the requirements of 
Rule 9(b).  Accepting the factual assertions made by Foglia as 
true, we have patient logs that show that less Zemplar was 
used than would be required if it were used in the single use 
fashion.  We know that Medicare will reimburse for the full 
vial of Zemplar, regardless of whether all of the Zemplar is 
used, and that this provides an opportunity for the sort of 
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fraud alleged by Foglia.  At this point we must assume that 
Foglia is correct in alleging that Renal did not follow the 
procedures that it should have followed if it was to harvest the 
“extra” Zemplar from the used vials.  Although we recognize 
that this hypothesis could be challenged, it certainly suffices 
to give Renal notice of the charges against it, as is required by 
Rule 9(b).  This conclusion is further supported by the fact 
that Renal, and only Renal, has access to the documents that 
could easily prove the claim one way or another—the full 
billing records from the time under consideration.  Under 
these circumstances, Foglia has provided sufficient facts to 
meet the requirements under Rule 9(b), and has therefore also 
met the requirements to state a claim under 12(b)(6).   
 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the 
dismissal of the factually false claim portion of Foglia’s SAC 
and remand to the District Court for further appropriate 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
